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1. Introduction 
 
On January 11, 2001, the German Schutzgemeinschaft der Kleinaktionäre – an association for 
the protection of the interests of small shareholders – announced a warning that the lock-up 
provision of Letsbuyit.com, an E-commerce firm, would expire on January 21. This warning 
was published in all major newspapers, expressing concern about the fact that most of the 
incumbent shareholders of the trouble-shaken firm would probably sell their shares upon 
expiration at the prevailing market price of €0.30, given that some of them had an initial 
investment per share of only €0.01.1 Although this information was public ex ante, the share 
price of Letsbuyit.com declined by almost 50 percent on the first trading day after the lock-up 
expiration, and the trading volume was the highest for all shares on the German XETRA 
stock exchange system on that day.  
In this chapter I explore the stock price impact of expirations of lock-up provisions 
that prevent insiders from selling their shares after the initial public offering (IPO). I examine 
172 lock-up expirations of 142 IPOs floated on Germany’s Neuer Markt. This chapter 
provides two contributions to the literature on IPOs and lock-up provisions. First, it 
documents further evidence on downward-sloping demand curves and costly arbitrage for a 
capital market outside the United States. I find statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns and a twenty-five percent increase in trading volume surrounding lock-up expiration. 
The negative abnormal returns are larger for firms with high volatility, superior performance 
between the IPO date and the lock-up expiration date, and low free float. 
Second, and more important, I can differentiate between the effects of mandatory 
lock-up provisions and the U.S.-type private lock-up agreements between issuers and 
underwriters. The latter I refer to as ‘voluntary’ lock-up agreements that serve as a 
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commitment device to reduce information asymmetry at the IPO. I show that the average 
negative price reaction is significantly stronger for the expiration of voluntary lock-up 
agreements than for mandatory prohibitions of disposal. Furthermore, I find that venture-
capital financed firms experience more negative abnormal returns than non-venture backed 
firms, on average. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews other studies 
that have investigated lock-up agreements. Section 3 describes the nature of mandatory and 
voluntary lock-up provisions in Germany. Section 4 presents the data description and the 
sample selection. Section 5 presents the event study methodology. Results on abnormal 
returns surrounding the time of the lock-up expiration for both types of provisions and on 
abnormal volume are analyzed in section 6. Section 7 investigates the relation between 
certain firm characteristics and the price reaction. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review  
 
Field and Hanka (2001) examine the expiration of IPO share lockups in the United States. 
They find a significantly negative three-day abnormal return of minus 1.5 percent and a 
permanent 40 percent increase in trading volume upon expiration of the lock-up period for 
1,948 firms in the period 1988-1997. In another study, Keasler (2001) finds negative 
abnormal returns prior to the lock-up releases and shows that unrestricted investors liquidate 
positions prior to the scheduled lock-up release. He finds that negative abnormal returns are 
more robust for firms that are not influenced by SEC Rule 144 than for firms that are. 
Cao et al. (2004) test the hypothesis that insider trading impairs market liquidity by 
analyzing intraday trades and quotes around 1,497 IPO lock-up expirations in the period 
1995-1999. They find that, while lock-up expirations are associated with considerable insider 
   
trading activity for some IPO firms, they have little effect on effective spreads. Thus, they 
argue that blockholding insider traders can enter a market from which they had previously 
been absent, and substantially change trading volume and share price without impairing 
market liquidity. 
Aggarwal et al. (2002) develop a model in which managers strategically underprice 
IPOs to maximize personal wealth from selling shares at lock-up expiration. They test the 
model on a sample of IPOs in the 1990s and find – consistent with their model - that higher 
ownership by managers is positively correlated with first-day underpricing, underpricing is 
positively correlated with research coverage. Finally, research coverage is positively 
correlated with stock returns and insider selling at the lock-up expiration.  
Brav and Gompers (2003) focus on the role of lock-ups as a commitment device to 
alleviate moral hazard problems in IPOs. They find that investment banks impose longer 
lock-ups on their IPO firms, when moral hazard in the aftermarket is higher. On the other 
hand, they show that venture-backed firms and firms going public with high-quality 
underwriters are more likely to have early releases of insider lock-up restrictions. 
Ofek and Richardson (2000) investigate volume and price patterns when the lock-up 
period ends, and document that there is a 3 percent drop in the stock price, and a 40 percent 
increase in volume. They argue that the evidence is consistent with a downward sloping 
demand curve for shares.  
Harper et al. (2004) look at follow-on offerings and how these alter firm value above 
and beyond the typical lock-up effects, and whether the effects are conditioned by firm-
specific variables. They find that follow-on offerings elicit an average market response of 
minus 3.21% over a three-day period surrounding the filing date. In their sample, the 
offerings experience adverse effects as of lock-up expiration that are about 3.75% worse than 
other IPOs, after considering other factors. Overall, their research suggests that follow-on 
   
offerings benefit some insiders who can circumvent the lock-up expiration date, at the 
expense of other investors. 
There are only a few studies that examine capital markets other than the United States. 
Surprisingly, to the opposite of studies on U.S. data, Espenlaub et al. (2001) do not find 
significant abnormal returns around the expiry for a sample of IPO lock-up agreements in the 
United Kingdom.  Goergen et al. (2004) compare the characteristics of lock-up agreements in 
German and French firms that went public on the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché 
during the years 1996/97 to 2000. They find that the level of uncertainty about the firm’s 
prospects and venture backing have a major influence on the characteristics of the lock-up 
contracts. In addition, shareholder characteristics explain the diversity of contracts that exist 
within the same firm. However, their paper does not look at price reactions upon the lock-up 
expiration day. This chapter aims to fill this gap. 
 
3. Mandatory and voluntary lock-up provisions in Germany 
 
In March 1997, Deutsche Börse established the Neuer Markt, a trading segment for 
innovative growth stocks, who had to meet international standards of transparency and 
publicity.2 Trading on the Neuer Markt took place in the Regulated Unofficial Market 
(Freiverkehr) under private law, but all companies admitted to the Neuer Markt also had to be 
admitted to the Regulated Market (Geregelter Markt). Organized under private law, Deutsche 
Börse formally imposed strict admission and disclosure requirements for the Neuer Markt.  
In theory, the legal framework of the Neuer Market was comparable to and, in some 
respects, even stricter than the admission requirements and post-listing duties under the SEC 
regime in the United States. In practice, however, the system has been hampered by 
                                                          
2 Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations 
   
inconsistent enforcement by Deutsche Börse. The Neuer Markt rules were purely private 
agreements between Deutsche Börse and issuers (who were also its customers). The German 
stock market regulator – the BAWe now BAFin - did not have a mandate to supervise these. 
A total of 342 companies had listed on the Neuer Markt by July 2001. Although a 
number of other European growth markets opened3, these had been significantly less popular 
with issuers. The Neuer Markt quickly became Europe’s biggest exchange for securities of 
innovative growth companies. In the end, the Neuer Markt was severely hit by the collapse of 
share prices following the bursting of the bubble and was finally shut down, because of the 
irreparable loss in investor confidence.  
 Deutsche Börse required all issuers to sign and comply with the so-called 
“Undertaking Concerning the Prohibition on Disposal”, as stated in the Neuer Markt Rules 
and Regulations: 
 
“Prohibition on Disposal 
(1) The issuer shall be obligated, subject to the applicable provisions of the 
national corporate law, to refrain, within a period of six months from the date of 
admission of the shares to the Neuer Markt, from offering or selling shares directly or 
indirectly, or announcing such action, or taking other measures economically 
equivalent to a sale. Further, the issuer shall inform Deutsche Börse without delay 
should it become aware of any factors indicating a breach of the prohibition on 
disposal on the part of an existing shareholder” (part 2, 2.2). 
 
The prohibition of disposal, although legally only a private contract between the issuer and 
Deutsche Börse, was effectively a mandatory lock-up rule, since it was a listing requirement 
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Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in London and NASDAQ Europe in Brussels (EASDAQ). 
   
applying to all firms on the Neuer Markt and (at least in theory but less so in practice) 
enforceable by law. 
Furthermore, a number of issuers stated in the offering prospectus that their 
shareholders had agreed not to sell shares for a longer period without the consent of the 
underwriter under a voluntary lock-up agreement. These voluntary lock-up agreements were 
not mandated by the stock exchange; hence they could only be enforced if the underwriter 
undertook legal actions in case of deviation (which basically never happened). Typically, 
while the mandatory prohibition applied to all existing shareholders holding stock before the 
offering, only the management and the largest incumbent shareholders were locked by a 
voluntary non-selling agreement. For example, while usually small incumbent shareholders 
and venture capitalists were allowed to sell six months after the IPO, the founding members 
and/or the top management of the firm often agreed to lock their shares for an additional 
period of six-to-30-months. 
Table 1 gives an overview on the insider trading regulation rules that applied to 
German firms at the time of the Neuer Markt, as compared to those for U.S. IPO firms. 
Mandatory lock-up rules exist only in Germany, whereas there are more general disclosure 
rules and restrictions concerning insider sales in the United States. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In this paper I am interested in mandatory and voluntary lock-up provisions. 
Technically, the two types of lock-up provisions are different in nature. However, given the 
severe adverse selection problem in the going public process, both serve as a commitment 
device to induce the public to buy shares at the offering (Brav and Gompers, 2003). The 
mandatory prohibition of disposal was to signal to the public that the Deutsche Börse would 
   
be committed to enforce this device. The (second) voluntary lock-up agreement signals not 
only the commitment of the issuing firm, but may also reflect the quality of the underwriter. 
 Venture capitalists typically do not lock their investments for more than the 
mandatory six-month period in Germany. Their business model forces them to unwind their 
equity stakes in portfolio investments that successfully go public.  On the one hand, one 
would therefore expect that venture backed firms have a larger number of shares coming to 
market at lock-up expiration (Brav and Gompers, 2003). On the other hand, venture 
capitalists may want to maintain a reputation of financing high-quality IPOs. Thus, they 
could force the management of their portfolio firms to agree upon a further voluntary lock-up 
provision, and they may want to retain their own shares for signaling reasons. Or, as Barry et 
al. (1990: p. 461) put it: “By retaining their share ownership, the venture capitalists can 
provide assurance of continued monitoring and can credibly signal their belief in the firms‘ 
prospects”. Both arguments have conflicting implications for abnormal price reactions and 
the contractual structure of lock-up provisions. 
 
4. Data description and sample selection 
 
This study investigates all IPOs on the Neuer Markt segment from its inception in 1997 until 
October 1999. For these 194 firms, all lock-up events were identified and the exact dates 
hand-collected from the offering prospectuses. In some cases the issuers had to be contacted 
in order to clarify the exact date. One firm drops out of the sample, because it has a short 
lock-up of only three months. Another 26 firms are excluded from the sample because price 
data could not be retrieved. In order to identify an information-clean event, 25 firms with 
confounding news (e.g., earnings announcements) one week before and after the event day of 
the lock-up expiration are eliminated from the sample. The remaining sample consists of 142 
   
IPO firms floated on the Neuer Markt. Of those 142 firms 30 have an additional voluntary 
lock-up agreement as stated in the offering prospectus. The final full sample therefore 
consists of 172 lock-up expiration events. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for 142 
sample IPO firms. 
 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
For the empirical analysis, stock market data could be taken into account until June 
30, 2000. The event window ends 30 trading days subsequent to the IPO. Daily stock price 
and trading volume data are directly provided by the Deutsche Börse, and are adjusted for 
dividend payments and capital changes. Information on free float and venture capital 
financing are obtained directly from prospectuses. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of lock-up length for the sample of lock-up provisions. 
Most of the IPO firms do not have a voluntary lock-up agreement complementing the 
prohibition of disposal. The majority is only locked for six months.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
5. Event study methodology 
 
Abnormal returns for each IPO are calculated over the event window (t-10; t30) as the 
difference between the actual return and the expected return. The expected return is 
benchmarked against market returns as well as by estimating a market model, using a simple 
OLS regression. The estimation window for the market model is the 90-day period (t-100; t-11). 
   
The value-weighted NEMAX All-Share Performance Index is used as proxy for the market 
return. Thus the abnormal return (ARit) is calculated as: 
 
ARit = Rit - [αi + βi E(Rmt)]        (1) 
with Rit actual return of stock i at time t, 
 E(Rmt) expected return of the (NEMAX) market at time t, 
 αi constant return component, 
 βi sensitivity of firm i’s stock returns to the market index return, 
 εit uncorrelated random error term. 
 
For testing the statistical significance of the abnormal returns a set of parametric as 
well as nonparametric tests is employed. I haven chosen the simple t-test and the modified t-
test proposed by Brown and Warner (1985). In order to check for the influence of non-normal 
distribution of residuals in small samples, the nonparametric rank test of Corrado (1989) is 
also applied. In order to compute a potentially more powerful test, the one proposed by 
Böhmer et al. (1991) that takes heteroskedasticity into account, but explicitly employs 
information from the estimation period, is finally run.  
Calculation of abnormal trading volume is done using a simple constant mean 
methodology. First, the average trading volume for each sample firm in the estimation period 
is calculated. Then an abnormal volume index (AVI) is computed as follows: 
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where Vit is shares traded in firm i at time t, and Vi  is the average trading volume in 
the estimation period. Finally, the abnormal volume index is averaged across firms in the 
sample: 
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6. Event study results 
 
This section presents the event study results. Since the date of the lock-up expiration is 
common knowledge at the time of the IPO, one would not expect to find abnormal returns 
surrounding the event day, assuming that markets are informationally efficient. 
Figure 2 presents a time series plot of the average cumulative abnormal return and 
shows that the share price declines sharply around the lock-up expiration day. For the period 
from ten days before the unlock day through 30 days after, the cumulative abnormal return is 
significantly negative at –7.95 percent. Cumulative abnormal returns over various event 
windows are tabulated in Table 4. Sixty percent of the daily abnormal returns on the unlock 
day are negative. The results are robust to different specifications of event window, 
benchmark, calculation of abnormal returns, and the test statistic employed.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 about here] 
 
Figure 3 and Table 5 and show the results for mandatory versus voluntary lock-up 
provisions. Both experience significantly negative abnormal returns on the unlock day. 
However, those stocks with a complementary lock-up expiration underperform the 
benchmark by more than twenty percent. 
   
 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 5 about here] 
 
Thus, there is a significantly negative abnormal return upon lock-up expiration, which 
is stronger for voluntary lock-up agreements. An explanation of this finding is that founding 
entrepreneurs, managers, and other corporate insiders are more likely to be subject to the 
longer voluntary lock-up period. These insiders are assumed to have higher equity stakes. 
When these insiders sell, more shares will therefore enter the market, on average, than at the 
first mandatory lock-up expiration that restricts other investors and friends and family from 
selling. However, since I have 30 complementary lock-up agreements versus 142 mandatory 
prohibitions of disposal, one should be careful when interpreting this result. 
Finally, since the cumulative abnormal return is still negative after 30 trading days 
following the unlock day, I can reject a price pressure hypothesis. This price pressure 
hypothesis would predict only a temporary effect (Scholes, 1972). 
Figure 4 plots the sample mean of the daily abnormal volume as defined in Equation 
(2).  Figure 4 shows that, for the full sample, volume increases temporarily to 25 percent 
above average on the day after the unlock day, and remains at that level throughout the event 
window. Thus, unlocking the shares of the incumbent shareholders seems to result in a 
permanent increase in trading volume. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
7. Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal returns 
 
   
Tables 6 to 10 present the mean and median abnormal returns for various subsamples, and 
Table 12 presents pooled OLS regressions of the cumulative abnormal return on several 
control variables. Table 6 shows that firms with a high standard deviation in the estimation 
period (between IPO and unlock day) experience significantly negative abnormal returns of –
20.41 percent in the thirty-day event window. On the other hand, firms with volatility below 
the median experience significantly positive abnormal returns of +9.72 percent during the 
same time interval. Although the causality is not clear-cut, this supports the risk-
diversification hypothesis proposed by Meulbroek (2001) that states that insiders of risky 
high-growth firms have to reduce their stakes in order to decrease the suboptimal risk 
inherent in their portfolios. The significantly negative slope of volatility in the cross-sectional 
regressions supports this risk diversification argument 
 
[Insert Figure 5 and Table 6 about here] 
 
A similar line of reasoning applies to the post-IPO performance (until the unlock day). 
Those firms that experience superior returns prior to the lock-up expiration seem to have 
significantly negative abnormal price decreases, while those firms whose stocks performed 
with below median performance do not have any abnormal price reactions at all. The 
coefficient on the post-IPO returns until the unlock is significantly negative in the cross-
sectional regressions. Investors seem to be more eager to sell when the price of their shares 
has risen than when it has fallen (Odean, 1998). 
 
[Insert Figure 6 and Table 7 here] 
 
   
If arbitrage were costly, proxies for the amount of shares that come to market at the 
expiration of the lock-up would be positively related to the price decline. Firms with a larger 
fraction of their shares locked up (i.e., firms with lower free float) would have a greater 
number of shares brought to market at the unlock day, and hence should experience larger 
price declines (Brav and Gompers, 2003). I find that firms with a free float below the median 
have significantly negative abnormal returns, while firms with high free float do not 
experience abnormal returns on the unlock day. However, free float is not significant in the 
cross-sectional regressions. This could be due to the fact that free float is only an imperfect 
proxy for the amount of shares that come to market on the unlock day. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 and Table 8 here] 
 
Interestingly, for firms with abnormal trading volume larger than the median, I cannot 
find statistically significant negative abnormal returns. This is puzzling, since I would expect 
a positive relation between the price drop and trading volume, if the abnormal price reaction 
is driven by downward-sloping demand curves (Shleifer, 1986). Trading volume is not 
significant in the cross-sectional regressions. This finding can be attributed to either a very 
noisy proxy for trading volume or support for a liquidity story. For those stocks that have low 
liquidity, there is not sufficient demand to absorb the sell orders upon lock-up expiration. 
Then trading in these stocks ‘dries out’, which leads to the abnormal price decrease. 
However, I have no direct evidence to support his claim. Future research would have to take 
examine better proxies for liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads, which are unavailable to me. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
   
One of the most intriguing results is the empirical observation that only venture-
backed IPOs experience significantly negative abnormal returns of –10.64 percent, while 
non-venture backed firms experience positive if any abnormal returns. However, when 
included in the cross-sectional regressions, the venture-capital dummy is negative but not 
statistically different from zero. This may be due to the fact that I cannot take the exact 
amount of venture financing and the reputation of the venture capitalist into account. In any 
case, this puzzling result is similar to the finding of Brav and Gompers (2003) that the 
presence of venture capital investors is associated with larger price declines in U.S. IPOs. 
Their explanation for this result is that VC-backing means a greater number of shares brought 
to the market, since venture capitalists distribute shares to their investors upon the lock-up 
expiration date (who then sell these shares directly to the market, if they have an automatic 
selling policy). Thus, on average, a larger number of shares will come to the market for VC-
backed companies than for other companies. These results are later confirmed by a study of 
Kraus and Burghof (2003) who show that venture-backed IPOs seem to perform significantly 
better before than after the expiration of lock-up periods in Germany. 
 
[Insert Tables 10-12 about here] 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This chapter explores the stock price impact of expirations of lock-up provisions that prevent 
insiders from selling their shares after the initial public offering (IPO). I examine 172 lock-up 
expirations of 142 IPOs floated on Germany’s Neuer Markt. Using an event-study 
methodology I detect statistically significant negative abnormal returns and a twenty-five 
   
percent increase in trading volume surrounding lock-up expiration. This adds further 
evidence to the existing U.S. studies showing downward-sloping demand curves and costly 
arbitrage (Shleifer, 1986; Scholes, 1972).  
For the first time, I can differentiate between the effects of mandatory lock-up 
provisions and the U.S.-type private lock-up agreements between issuers and underwriters. 
We refer to the latter as ‘voluntary’ lock-up agreements. I show that the average negative 
price reaction is significantly stronger for the expiration of voluntary lock-up agreements than 
for mandatory prohibitions of disposal.  
I investigate several control variables and find that the negative abnormal returns are 
larger for firms with high volatility, superior performance after the IPO, and low free float. 
Furthermore, I find that venture-capital financed firms experience more negative abnormal 
returns than non-venture backed firms, on average.  
A puzzling finding is the fact that abnormal trading volume seems to be negatively 
related to the price decline upon lock-up expiration. Unfortunately, due to data restrictions, I 
can not differentiate between liquidity effects and information effects, and must leave the 
explanation of this result for future research.  
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Table 1: Insider trading regulation for IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt versus the 
United States 
 German rules U.S. rules 
Lock-up provisions   
Mandatory rules 
- Prohibition on disposal 
(Paragraph 7.2.9 Rules and 
Regulations Neuer Markt) 
non-existent 
Voluntary agreements 
- Complementary lock-up contracts 
between underwriter and issuer 
- Pool contracts among incumbent 
shareholders of the firm 
- Private lock-up contracts 
between underwriter and issuer 
Legal insider selling 
restrictions 
and disclosure rules 
- Section 21 WpHG (German 
Securities Law) 
- Section 13 WpHG 
- Rule 144 
- Section 16 Securities Exchange 
Act (SEA) 
 
    Table 2: Sample selection 
 
Initial public offerings and first 
trading of shares on the Neuer Markt 
from 03/97 to 12/99 
 
194 firms 
 
- Firm with lock-up less  6 months 1 firm 
- Data restrictions  26 firms 
- 
Confounding news one week before 
and after the event 
 
25 firms 
= Final sample of firms 142 firms 
+ of which have complementary lock-up agreement 30 firms 
= Final sample of events 172 events 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
 Min 25
th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Volatility 1.62 3.33 4.00 4.80 10.09 4.37 1.65 
Post-IPO 
performance (log) -339.14 -83.16 -30.28 48.65 240.73 -24.46 100.76 
Free Float in % 18.60 25.03 30.50 40.00 100.00 36.39 16.72 
Trading volume 0.10 0.48 0.83 1.44 6.18 1.16 1.07 
Underpricing (%) -14.11 4.24 23.47 57.01 140.65 34.70 37.70 
Market value of 
equity (DM 
millions) 
5.62 32.76 56.50 110.68 876.00 97.39 129.66 
 
Volatility is the standard deviation in the estimation period (between IPO and unlock day). Post-IPO 
performance is the log of the total return from the IPO until the unlock day. Free float is taken as reported by 
Deutsche Börse and checked against the offering prospectuses. Trading volume is order book turnover as 
reported by Deutsche Börse (excluding OTC trades). Underpricing is the first day return against the offering 
price. Market value of equity is number of shares issued multiplied by the issue price, as reported by Deutsche 
Börse. 
 
   
 
Table 4: Event study results: full sample 
 
All events [N=172] 
 
Event 
window CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR 
t-10 to t-1 -0.84 51.10 -0.41 
t-2 0.05 54.65 -0.51 
t-1 -0.82** 59.88 -0.92 
t0 -0.19 59.30 -0.61 
t1 -0.03 55.81 -0.59 
t2 -0.21 56.98 -0.72 
t-2 to t2 -1.18rr 57.33 -0.61 
t-1 to t0 -1.01* 59.59 -0.61 
t-10 to t10 -3.76** 56.20 -0.46 
t1 to t15 -3.30* 55.47 -0.45 
t-1 to t30 -7.95*** 56.78 -0.48 
 
***,** and *  denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. TTT, TT, T denote significance 
of the simple t-test; ttt, tt, t denote significance of the Brown/Warner t-test;  and rrr, rr, r denote significance of the 
nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). 
 
Table 5: Cumulative abnormal returns around mandatory versus complementary lock-
up expirations 
 
 
 
Mandatory prohibition of disposal [N=142]
 
Complementary lock-up agreements [N=30]
Event window CAR [%] Percent negative Median CAR CAR [%] Percent negative Median CAR
t-10 to t-1 -0.73 56.83 -0.45 -1.38 52.67 -0.29 
t-2 0.25 53.52 -0.48 -0.88 60.00 -0.92 
t-1 -0.54 59.15 -0.82 -2.14*** 63.33 -1.88 
t0 0.00 57.76 -0.27 -1.06 66.67 -0.81 
t1 0.00 57.04 -0.55 -0.14 62.31 -0.06 
t2 -0.22 55.63 -0.53 -0.12 63.33 -1.04 
t-2 to t2 -0.52 56.36 -0.51 -4.34** 60.67 -0.99 
t-1 to t0 -0.54 58.45 -0.53 -3.20** 65.00 -1.14 
t-10 to t10 -3.36** 59.36 -0.47 -5.62t 54.60 -0.40 
t1 to t15 -2.67T 55.45 -0.44 -6.25** 55.56 -0.49 
t-1 to t30 -5.35*** 56.16 -0.44 -20.24*** 59.69 -0.74 
 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. TTT, TT, T denote significance 
of the simple t-test; ttt, tt, t denote significance of the Brown/Warner t-test;  and rrr, rr, r denote significance of the 
nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). 
 
   
Table 6: Cumulative abnormal returns partitioned by residual standard deviation 
 
 
 
Firms with volatility < median [N=71] 
 
Firms with volatility > median [N=71] 
Event 
window CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR 
t-10 to t-1 0.80 58.03 -0.41 -2.25 55.27 -0.56 
t-2 -0.30 60.56 -0.57 0.80 46.48 -0.76 
t-1 -0.23 59.15 -0.50 -0.85 59.15 -1.53 
t0 -0.26 63.38 -0.24 0.25 52.11 -0.59 
t1 0.73** 50.70 -0.15 -0.74t 63.38 -0.87 
t2 0.25 52.65 -0.03 -0.70 60.56 -1.39 
t-2 to t2 0.20 56.90 -0.34 -1.24 56.34 -0.94 
t-1 to t0 -0.48 61.27 -0.27 -0.60 55.63 -1.06 
t-10 to t10 3.54** 54.93 -0.40 -10.26*** 58.15 -0.56 
t1 to t15 4.79*** 51.17 -0.08 -10.13*** 59.72 -0.86 
t-1 to t30 9.72*** 52.99 -0.22 -20.41*** 59.33 -0.81 
 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. TTT, TT, T denote significance 
of the simple t-test; ttt, tt, t denote significance of the Brown/Warner t-test;  and rrr, rr, r denote significance of the 
nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Cumulative abnormal returns partitioned by post-IPO performance 
 
 
 
Firms with Performance < median [N=71] 
 
Firms with Performance > median [N=71] 
Event 
window CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR 
t-10 to t-1 0.60 57.04 -0.37 -2.05 56.62 -0.54 
t-2 -0.49 56.34 -0.57 0.98TT 50.70 -0.68 
t-1 -0.24 59.15 -0.71 -0.84T 59.15 -1.07 
t0 0.82T 53.52 -0.11 -0.82T 61.97 -0.93 
t1 -0.14 57.75 -0.21 0.14 56.34 -0.60 
t2 -0.33 50.70 -0.33 -0.12 60.56 -0.93 
t-2 to t2 -0.38 55.49 -0.40 -0.66 57.75 -0.67 
t-1 to t0 0.58 56.34 -0.21 -1.66** 60.56 -1.00 
t-10 to t10 2.09t 54.73 -0.34 -8.81*** 58.35 -0.57 
t1 to t15 2.02tt 52.11 -0.23 -7.37*** 58.78 -0.80 
t-1 to t30 4.26ttt 53.83 -0.28 -14.96*** 58.49 -0.71 
 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. TTT, TT, T denote significance 
of the simple t-test; ttt, tt, t denote significance of the Brown/Warner t-test;  and rrr, rr, r denote significance of the 
nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Cumulative abnormal returns partitioned by tradable shares after the IPO 
(free float) 
 
  
Firms with free float < median [N=71] 
 
 
Firms with free float > median [N=71] 
 
Event 
window CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR 
t-10 to t-1 -2.19 57.61 -0.49 0.74 56.06 -0.43 
t-2 -0.06 52.11 -0.58 0.56 54.93 -0.58 
t-1 -0.48 63.38 -1.07 -0.60 52.57 -0.18 
t0 -0.31 59.15 -0.49 0.31 56.34 -0.18 
t1 -0.64r 70.42 -1.02 0.64 43.66 0.00 
t2 -0.48 59.15 -1.84 0.03 52.11 -0.31 
t-2 to t2 -1.97rr 60.85 -0.92 0.94 52.39 -0.16 
t-1 to t0 -0.79 61.27 -0.82 -0.29 55.63 -0.18 
t-10 to t10 -8.95*** 59.09 -0.49 2.23t 53.99 -0.40 
t1 to t15 -7.39*** 58.78 -0.79 2.05tt 52.11 -0.15 
t-1 to t30 -13.19*** 58.93 -0.72 2.49tt 53.39 -0.24 
 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. TTT, TT, T denote significance 
of the simple t-test; ttt, tt, t denote significance of the Brown/Warner t-test;  and rrr, rr, r denote significance of the 
nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). 
 
 
    
 
 
Table 9: Cumulative abnormal returns partitioned by abnormal trading volume 
 
  
Firms with abnormal trading volume < median 
[N=71] 
 
 
Firms with abnormal trading volume > median 
[N=71] 
 
Event 
window CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR 
t-10 to t-1 -5.27*** 59.01 -0.56*** 3.82 54.65 -0.29
t-2 -0.01 50.70 -0.68* 0.51 56.34 -0.54
t-1 -1.04** 63.38 -1.07** -0.03 54.93 -0.16
t0 -0.44 57.75 -0.13 0.44 57.75 -0.34
t1 -1.41** 61.97 -0.57 1.39 52.11 -0.27
t2 0.04 53.52 -0.43 -0.49 57.75 -1.39**
t-2 to t2 -2.87tt 57.46 -0.56** 1.83 55.77 -0.50*
t-1 to t0 -1.49** 60.56 -0.68** 0.40 56.34 -0.29
t-10 to t10 -11.14*** 57.88 -0.56*** 4.41 55.20 -0.31*
t1 to t15 -6.71* 56.34 -0.46** 1.36 54.55 -0.41*
t-1to t30 -12.98*** 56.90 -0.52*** 2.29* 55.50 -0.45
 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. TTT, TT, T denote significance 
of the simple t-test; ttt, tt, t denote significance of the Brown/Warner t-test;  and rrr, rr, r denote significance of the 
nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). 
 
   
Table 10: Cumulative abnormal returns of venture-backed versus non-venture-backed 
IPOs 
 
 Non-venture-backed IPOs [N=67] Venture-backed IPOs [N=75] 
Event window CAR [%] Percent negative Median CAR CAR [%] 
Percent 
negative Median CAR 
t-10 to t-1 2.46 55.67 -0.41 -3.57
t 57.87 -0.41 
t-2 1.53** 46.27 0.22 -0.89* 60.00 -1.04 
t-1 0.32 55.22 -0.56 -1.30** 62.67 -1.05 
t0 0.52 56.27 -0.05 -0.48 58.67 -0.59 
t1 0.83 53.73 -0.50 -0.74 61.57 -0.80 
t2 -0.15 59.70 -0.90 -0.29 56.38 -0.31 
t-2 to t2 3.05** 54.32 -0.33 -3.71*** 58.67 -0.77 
t-1 to t0 0.84 55.97 -0.14 -1.78** 60.67 -0.62 
t-10 to t10 2.78 55.37 -0.36 -8.86*** 57.59 -0.55 
t1 to t15 -0.81 54.43 -0.37 -4.34* 56.36 -0.47 
t16 to t30 0.54 55.82 -0.36 -4.52* 57.24 -0.50 
t-1 to t30 3.36 55.18 -0.39 -10.64*** 57.04 -0.49 
 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. TTT, TT, T denote significance 
of the simple t-test; ttt, tt, t denote significance of the Brown/Warner t-test;  and rrr, rr, r denote significance of the 
nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). 
 
 
 
Table 11: Z-statistics of the Mann-Whitney-U-test 
 
Event window Volatility < median 
Volatility > 
median 
Mann-
Whitney-U-test 
t-10 to t10 3.54** -10.26*** -3.17*** 
t1 to t15 4.79*** -10.13*** -4.52*** 
t-1 to t30 9.72*** -20.41*** -5.44*** 
 
Post-IPO 
performance < 
median 
Post-IPO 
performance < 
median 
Mann-
Whitney-U-test 
t-10 to t10 2.09t -8.81*** -3.15*** 
t1 to t15 2.02tt -7.37*** -3.10*** 
t-1 to t30 4.26ttt -14.96*** -3.19*** 
 Free Float< Median 
Free Float> 
Median 
Mann-
Whitney-U-test 
t-10 to t10 -8.95*** 2.23t -2.35*** 
t1 to t15 -7.39*** 2.05tt -2.50*** 
t-1 to t30 -13.19*** 2.49tt -2.10** 
 
Abnormal 
trading volume 
< median 
Abnormal 
trading volume 
> median 
Mann-
Whitney-U-test 
t-10 to t10 -11.14*** 4.41* -2.40*** 
t1 to t15 -6.71* 1.36 -2.80*** 
t-1 to t30 -4.79tt 0.52 -1.95** 
 -12.98*** 2.29* -1.18 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
   
Table 12: Regression results for cumulative abnormal returns around lock-up 
expirations 
 
 Dependent variable  CAR [t-1 to t30] 
Constant 27.178* (1.922) 
Volatility -7.723*** (-4.125) 
Return since IPO -0.101*** (-3.015) 
Free Float 0.161 (0.786) 
Abnormal Trading Volume 1.605 (0.635) 
Underpricing -0.123 (-0.010) 
Venture Capital-Backing -4.910 (-0.902) 
Market Value of Equity -0.057** (-2.045) 
 
Number of observations 134 
 
Adjusted R² 0.326 
F-Statistic 6.495*** 
 
***,** and * denote significance of all test metrics at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Length of lock-up agreements 
 
 
* Other Lock-up-agreements involve three firms, of which two have a 6 plus 3 month lock-up, and one company 
that shortened the length to three months. 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns around unlock day 
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Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns based on the length of the lock-up period 
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Figure 4: Abnormal trading volume around unlock day 
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Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns based on residual standard deviation 
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Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns based on post IPO-performance 
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Figure 7: Cumulative abnormal returns based on fraction of tradable shares (free float) 
after the IPO 
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